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Functional neuroimaging research in humans has identified a number
of brain areas that are activated by the delivery of primary and
secondary reinforcers. The present study investigated how activity in
these reward-sensitive regions is modulated by the context in which
rewards and punishments are experienced. Fourteen healthy volun-
teers were scanned during the performance of a simple monetary
gambling task that involved a bwinQ condition (in which the possible
outcomes were a large monetary gain, a small gain, or no gain of
money) and a bloseQ condition (in which the possible outcomes were a
large monetary loss, a small loss, or no loss of money). We observed
reward-sensitive activity in a number of brain areas previously
implicated in reward processing, including the striatum, prefrontal
cortex, posterior cingulate, and inferior parietal lobule. Critically,
activity in these reward-sensitive areas was highly sensitive to the range
of possible outcomes from which an outcome was selected. In
particular, these regions were activated to a comparable degree by
the best outcomes in each condition–a large gain in the win condition
and no loss of money in the lose condition–despite the large difference
in the objective value of these outcomes. In addition, some reward-
sensitive brain areas showed a binary instead of graded sensitivity to
the magnitude of the outcomes from each distribution. These results
provide important evidence regarding the way in which the brain
scales the motivational value of events by the context in which these
events occur.
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Available online on ScienceDirect (www.sciencedirect.com).A fundamental function of the brain is to evaluate the mo-
tivational significance of ongoing events and to use this
information to adapt behavior. Neuroimaging studies of reward
processing have identified a number of brain areas that are
activated by the delivery of primary reinforcers such as appetitive
stimuli (Berns et al., 2001; McClure et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al.,
2004), and secondary reinforcement such as monetary gains and
losses (Breiter et al., 2001; Delgado et al., 2004; Elliott et al.,
2000; Holroyd et al., 2004b; Thut et al., 1997). However, it
remains to be determined precisely how information about reward
and punishment is encoded in these reward-sensitive neural
circuits. The aim of the present study was to investigate one
critical aspect of reward processing: the extent to which neural
coding of reward value is influenced by the context in which
outcomes are experienced.
We manipulated reward context by varying the range of
possible outcomes from which a particular outcome was drawn.
The fundamental question was whether neural activity in
reward-sensitive brain regions would vary solely with objective
reward value (context independence), or whether activity in
these areas would be scaled by subjective expectations about the
magnitude of the possible outcomes (context dependence). We
used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to explore
this issue of context dependence and independence at the level
of the whole brain. The experimental paradigm we used was a
simple monetary gambling task (cf. Holroyd et al., 2004a; Fig.
1A). In one condition, the win condition, the three possible
outcomes were +606, +306, and +06. In the other condition, the
lose condition, the three possible outcomes were 406, 206,
and 06. The question of interest was the extent to which
fMRI activity in reward-sensitive brain regions would be mo-
dulated by the context (win or lose) in which outcomes were
experienced.
One possibility is that particular brain areas show context-
dependent activity (Fig. 1B, top). An important feature of a context-YNIMG-02985; No. of pages 8; 4C: 2, 5
Fig. 1. (A) Illustration of task displays. See text for actual colors and size. (B) Schematic examples of context sensitivity in reward processing. Lose, win: task
conditions. Worst, intermediate, best: the worst, intermediate, and best of the three possible outcomes in each condition, as given by their objective values. The
ordinate corresponds to percentage BOLD signal increase associated with each outcome, and assumes that better outcomes elicit larger BOLD activity, as is the
case in the current data. Note that the relationship between the outcomes and percentage BOLD signal increase might follow any monotonically increasing
function; linear functions were adopted here only for ease of exposition.
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to a 06 outcome when it is experienced in the win condition (in
which 06 is the worst possible outcome) than when it is experienced
in the lose condition (in which 06 is the best possible outcome), but
should show a similar response to the +306 and 206 outcomes
(the intermediate outcomes of their respective conditions). A
context-independent system would show the opposite pattern:
equivalent responses to 06 outcomes in the win and lose conditions
but a different response to the +306 and 206 outcomes (Fig. 1B,
bottom). The former possibility would be consistent with theories
like reward prediction error theory, according to which brain areas
are sensitive to deviations from expected reward rather than to the
objective value of reward (Montague and Berns, 2002). The latter
possibility would be consistent with previous findings of over-
lapping but somewhat dissociable systems for processing abstract
rewards and punishments (Elliott et al., 2000; O’Doherty et al.,
2001; Zalla et al., 1999).Materials and methods
Participants
Fourteen young adults (six women), ranging in age from 22 to
31 years (M = 25.4) participated in the experiment. All participants
were right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal visual
acuity. They were paido20, plus a feedback-related bonus ofo9,
as described below. All participants provided written informedconsent, and the experiment was approved by the local research
ethics panel.
Task
Each trial (see Fig. 1A for an example) started with the
presentation of a central fixation point that was replaced after 1
s by three colored rectangles. The participants were asked to
imagine that these rectangles were playing cards presented face-
down. The three cards remained on the screen (for a maximum
of 2.8 s) until the participant selected one of them by pressing a
spatially corresponding button with the right index, middle, or
ring finger. After a variable interval, the participant was
presented with a central fixation point for 1 s, followed by a
gray rectangle with a number indicating the outcome of the trial
(in eurocents). Participants were asked to imagine that this was
their chosen card flipped over, and were informed that the
number on each chosen card would be added to (or subtracted
from) the total amount of bonus money awarded to them at the
end of the experiment. The feedback display remained on the
screen for 1 s, followed by an empty screen until the start of the
next trial. The time interval between the onset of the choice
display and the feedback display, and between the onset of the
feedback display and the choice display for the next trial varied
between three values that occurred with equal frequency: 4, 6.5,
and 9 s. The interval between stimulus events was jittered in
order to allow more efficient deconvolution of the hemodynamic
signal (Burock et al., 1998).
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color (red or green) of the cards in the choice display. One color
was associated with the win condition: Participants were
informed that the numbers on the back of the three cards with
this color were +60, +30, and 0, and that their goal was to try to
pick cards that would increase their bonus total. The other color
was associated with the lose condition: Participants were
informed that the numbers on the back of these three cards
were 40, 20, and 0, and that their goal was to try to avoid
picking cards that would decrease their bonus total. As in
previous research (e.g., Breiter et al., 2001; Delgado et al.,
2003), the gains were made larger than the losses to compensate
for the tendency of participants to assign greater weight to a loss
than to a gain of equal magnitude (Tversky and Kahneman,
1981). The difference in the size of gains and losses also
ensured that participants tended to accumulate winnings gradu-
ally throughout the experiment at an average rate of 56 per trial.
The assignment of card colors to experimental conditions was
varied across participants.
The two possible choice displays (red and green cards) and the
six possible outcomes (+60, +30, 0 in the win condition, 0 in the
lose condition, 20, 40) were varied on a trial-to-trial basis and
occurred equally often across the experiment. The order of
outcomes was varied across participants according to a pre-
determined, randomized sequence that was constrained to mini-
mize correlations between the eight predictors. The participants
were not told about these computer-controlled contingencies, nor
were they told that the sequence of outcomes was unaffected by
their response choices. Instead, they were simply instructed to buse
any strategy you want to help you maximize your bonus totalQ.
Because in truth there was no strategy to learn, there was no
meaningful performance measure in this task. Instead, the task
simply provided a realistic context in which rewards and penalties
and the anticipation thereof were experienced. Nevertheless, at
debriefing, most participants reported that they had attempted to
find a systematic pattern in the association between responses and
outcomes, and that they had felt disappointed when testing of a
specific hypothesis regarding this association led to unfavorable
outcomes.
Participants received instructions and ten practice trials outside
the scanner before entering the experimental phase. The exper-
imental phase consisted of 180 trials altogether, divided into six
equal blocks, with short breaks in between. At the end of each
block, participants were informed about their current cumulative
winnings. At the end of the experiment, participants had won ao9
bonus, which was then paid to them, in addition to their basic
financial compensation.
Stimuli
Stimuli were presented in color on a black background
projected onto a frosted screen, viewed by the participants through
a tilted mirror placed on top of the head coil. The fixation point
was white and subtended 0.48. The three rectangles in the choice
display were red or green with a thin white outline. They subtended
4.48  5.98, and the visual angle between the centers of the
rectangles was approximately 6.08. The rectangle in the feedback
display was gray with a thin white outline and subtended 4.48 
5.98. The outcome numerals were presented in a white, 44-size,
bold Courier New font and subtended approximately 1.68
vertically.fMRI image acquisition
Images were collected with a 1.5-T Siemens Sonata scanner
equipped with a volume head coil. Prior to the experimental
session, anatomical images were collected using a T1-weighted
MP-RAGE sequence (TR = 2700 ms, TE = 3.95 ms, TI = 950 ms,
FA = 88, 256  160 coronal matrix, 1.0  1.0 mm in-plane
resolution, 224 1.1-mm slices). Functional images were recon-
structed from twenty oblique slices acquired using a T2*-weighted
EPI sequence (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 60 ms, FA = 908, 64  64
matrix, 3.0  3.0 mm in-plane resolution, 20 5.0-mm slices, 1-mm
gap between slices). Image acquisition varied systematically across
trials with respect to stimulus onset, yielding an effectively higher
temporal sampling rate (Josephs et al., 1997). Six functional runs
(202 scans each) were collected. The first two scans of each run
were discarded to allow the longitudinal magnetization to reach a
steady state recovery value.
fMRI image analysis
Data were preprocessed and analyzed with BrainVoyager 2000
software (Maastricht, The Netherlands). Image preprocessing
consisted of: rigid-body 3D motion correction using trilinear
interpolation; slice scan time correction using sinc interpolation;
3D spatial smoothing with a 4-mm fullwidth at half maximum
(FWHM) Gaussian kernel; voxel-wise linear detrending, highpass
filtering (above 7 cycles per time course) to remove low
frequencies, and lowpass filtering with a 2.8-s FWHM Gausian
kernel to remove high frequencies. Spatial normalization was
performed using the standard 9-parameter landmark method of
Talairach and Tournoux (1988).
For each participant and voxel, the blood oxygen-level
dependent (BOLD) responses across the scanning run were
modeled with a general linear model that included nine regressors.
Two regressors accounted for choice displays indicating the win
condition and the lose condition. Six additional regressors
accounted for the six possible outcomes. A final regressor
accounted for the fixation period before each choice display and
feedback display. The hemodynamic response to each event was
modeled by convolving each regressor with a standard gamma
function (Boynton et al., 1996). For each voxel and each event
type, a parameter estimate (beta coefficient) was computed that
indicated the strength of covariance between the data and the
modeled response function; these estimates were corrected for
temporal autocorrelation using a first-order autoregressive model.
Pair-wise contrasts between parameter estimates for different
events were calculated for each participant and the results were
submitted to a group analysis that treated inter-subject variability
as a random effect. In a first step of the analyses, a whole-brain
analysis using a +606 vs. 406 contrast was carried out to identify
reward-sensitive brain areas. Statistical parametric maps were
derived from the resulting t values associated with each voxel and
were thresholded at a conservative value (P b 0.0005, uncorrected)
with a contiguity threshold of 60 mm3 as a further precaution
against type-1 errors (Forman et al., 1995). The location of the
peak activity associated with each cluster of activation was
reported in Talairach coordinates (Talairach and Tournoux,
1988). The reward-sensitive brain areas obtained in the initial
whole-brain analysis were defined as regions of interest (ROIs) for
subsequent analyses aimed at distinguishing between context
dependence and context independence.
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Behavior
There are few meaningful behavioral measures in the task,
because outcomes were unrelated to the participants’ behavior.
Since participants had 2.8 s to choose a card, there were very few
trials on which no response was recorded (M = 1.0 trials). The
choice reaction times for the trials on which a response was
recorded were faster for the win condition (M = 884 ms) than for
the lose condition [M = 981 ms; F(1,13) = 13.4, P = 0.003].
fMRI
The analysis of the fMRI data consisted of two steps. Previous
studies have found a number of brain areas that show strong
sensitivity to the magnitude of monetary rewards and punishments.
In the first step of the analysis, we wanted to identify reward-
sensitive brain areas in our participants by contrasting BOLD
responses to the highest (+606) and lowest (406) possible
outcomes. This contrast should reveal areas that are sensitive to
differences in experienced reward value, regardless of whether they
are context dependent or independent. Activation was observed in
a number of brain regions previously implicated in reward
processing, including several basal ganglia areas (putamen,
caudate, globus pallidus), prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate,
inferior parietal lobule, and cerebellum (Table 1). Each of these
regions showed greater activity for +606 than for 406; no region
showed greater activity for 406 than for +606. The ten brain
regions listed in Table 1 served as our reward-sensitive ROIs for
subsequent analyses.
In the second step of the analysis, we examined whether the
reward-sensitive ROIs showed context dependence or independ-
ence (or some intermediate pattern of activity) by contrasting, for
each area, the estimated magnitude of the BOLD responses
associated with the two intermediate outcomes (i.e., +306
vs. 206), and those associated with the two 06 outcomes (+06
vs. 06). In line with previous research (Holroyd et al., 2004a),
brain areas were considered context dependent if they satisfied the
following critical condition: a larger BOLD response to the best
outcome in the lose condition (06) than to the worst outcome in
the win condition (+06). In addition, context-dependent brain areasTable 1
List of reward-sensitive brain areas revealed by contrasting the highest outcome
Area Left/right Cluster
size (mm3)
X Y
Putamen Right 1481 19 7
Caudate nucleus Left 150 8 4
Globus pallidus Left 443 14 1
Inferior parietal lobule Left 283 48 52
Posterior cingulate gyrus Left 290 2 35
Posterior cingulate sulcus Left 63 1 31
Medial frontal gyrus Left 105 6 7
Middle frontal gyrus Left 60 19 4
Cerebellum Right 296 10 57
Cerebellum Left 92 38 51
Note. All regions are P b 0.0005, uncorrected.
CD = context dependent; CI = context independent.
a P values for paired t tests (statistical comparison of the beta coefficients assoc
b Significant test results ( P b 0.05).should also show comparable BOLD responses to the intermediate
outcomes from the win (+306) and lose (206) conditions (Fig.
1B, top). Conversely, brain areas were considered context
independent if they satisfied the two contrary conditions: Most
critically, context-independent brain areas should show differential
responses to the intermediate outcomes (+306 vs. 206) of the two
conditions. Furthermore, one should expect comparable responses
to the +06 outcome in the win condition and 06 outcome in the
loss condition (Fig. 1B, bottom). For each contrast (+06 vs. 06,
and +306 vs. 206), corresponding beta coefficients derived from
the general linear model were compared using 2-tailed paired t
tests. The resulting P values are reported in Table 1.
As Table 1 indicates, most of the reward-sensitive ROIs showed
context dependence: With the exception of two areas, the right
cerebellum and the left medial frontal gyrus, all ROIs showed a
significant difference in activity between the 06 outcomes in the
win condition (in which 06 was the worst outcome) and the lose
condition (in which 06 was the best outcome). In addition,
although one cannot draw strong conclusions from statistical null
effects, it is worth noting that of these ROIs, six showed
comparable BOLD responses to the +306 and 206 outcomes,
the intermediate outcomes of the two conditions. Thus, the pattern
of BOLD responses for these ROIs is consistent with the definition
of pure context dependence (06 N +06, +306 = 206). Two
further ROIs, the putamen and globus pallidus, demonstrated a
pattern of activity that fell between pure context dependence
and pure context independence: These regions showed differ-
ential responses to the 06 outcomes in the win and lose
conditions, but also showed differential responses to the +306
and 206 intermediate outcomes. In contrast, there were no
ROIs that satisfied the definition of pure context independence
(+306 N 206, 06 = +06).
The results are illustrated in Fig. 2, which shows event-related
averages associated with each of the six outcomes for repre-
sentative reward-sensitive ROIs. In general, this figure underlines
the notion that reward-sensitive brain activity is scaled in relation
to the range of possible outcomes. That is, the magnitudes of the
BOLD responses are ordered much like in Fig. 1B (top): The
best outcomes in each condition elicited the largest BOLD
response and the worst outcomes in each condition elicited the
smallest BOLD response, regardless of the objective value of
those outcomes. Two aspects of Fig. 2 are particularly note-and lowest outcome (+606 vs. 406)
Z Max
t value
+306 vs.
206a
+06 vs.
06a
+606 vs.
06a
CD/CI
1 8.92 0.03b b0.0001b 0.77 CD + CI
3 5.97 0.32 b0.0005b 0.31 CD
6 7.16 0.04b 0.004b 0.70 CD + CI
45 6.68 0.28 0.002b 0.48 CD
29 7.64 0.26 0.005b 0.37 CD
47 5.35 0.97 0.03b 0.65 CD
53 6.23 0.34 0.24 0.23 –
59 5.13 0.74 0.002b 0.18 CD
10 6.62 0.26 0.30 0.18 –
36 6.98 0.20 0.002b 0.30 CD
iated with different outcomes; df = 13).
Fig. 2. Event-related averages of the BOLD response associated with each of the six possible outcomes for six representative reward-sensitive regions of
interest. The abscissa indicates time relative to the onset of the outcome display. The ordinate indicates the percentage BOLD signal increase. Cond = condition.
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were elicited by the best outcomes in each of the two
conditions: +606 and 06. Interestingly, despite the large differ-
ence in the absolute value of these two outcomes, the
corresponding BOLD responses were strikingly similar: In none
of the ROIs was there a reliable difference between these two
outcomes (Table 1); if anything, in most ROIs, the 06 outcome
elicited a somewhat greater neural response than the +606
outcome. A second important feature of Fig. 2 is that for some of
the ROIs–most notably the caudate and the posterior cingulate
gyrus–the BOLD response to the intermediate outcomes was
similar to the BOLD response to the worst outcomes. This was
supported by a statistical comparison (t test) between the
summed beta coefficients for the intermediate outcomes (+306
and 206) and the summed beta coefficients for the worst
outcomes (+06 and 406). There were only four ROIs that
showed a significant difference (P b 0.05): the putamen, inferior
parietal lobule, middle frontal gyrus, and right cerebellum. These
findings suggest that most reward-sensitive ROIs showed a
binary instead of a graded sensitivity to the magnitude of theoutcomes. That is, these areas appear to classify outcomes into
two categories: The best outcomes are classified as good and all
other outcomes are classified as bad.
In an additional analysis, we examined expectation-related
activation in each of the reward-sensitive ROIs by contrasting the
BOLD responses to the choice displays associated with the win
and lose conditions (i.e., red vs. green cards). This analysis
indicated that only two of the ROIs exhibited differential BOLD
responses during the expectation period: the left posterior
cingulate sulcus, which showed increased activity in the win
condition compared to the lose condition (P = 0.02), and the
medial frontal gyrus, which showed the reverse pattern (P =
0.03). A subsequent whole-brain analysis of the expectation
period established that at the statistical threshold of P b 0.0005
(uncorrected), there were no areas that exhibited differential
activity for the two choice displays. Lowering the threshold to P b
0.005 (uncorrected) revealed only a few areas–including the right
precuneus (14, 45, 44), cerebellum (3, 41, 10), and the left
inferior frontal gyrus (35, 15, 8)–each of which showed larger
activity in the win condition.
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The results of the present study provide important insights into
the way in which information about rewards and penalties is
encoded in the brain. Our central finding is that reward-sensitive
areas throughout the brain exhibit a high degree of context
sensitivity. More specifically, the results suggest that reward
processing systems determine whether an outcome is favorable
or unfavorable on the basis of the range of possible outcomes
encountered in a particular setting—judging the best possible
outcome to be favorable and the worst possible outcome to be
unfavorable, regardless of the absolute magnitudes of these
outcomes. The scaling of the reward by the range of possible
outcomes is consistent with reward prediction error theory,
according to which brain areas are sensitive to deviations from
expected reward rather than to absolute magnitude of reward
(Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Montague and Berns, 2002; Schultz,
2002). Our findings are also consistent with previous research that
has identified brain areas showing modulation of reward-sensitive
activity by the context of the recent history of monetary rewards
and punishments (Akitsuki et al., 2003; Elliott et al., 2000;
Nakahara et al., 2004).
Initial evidence consistent with our finding of context
dependence was reported in a study by Breiter et al. (2001). In
this study, participants experienced monetary gains and losses that
were drawn, with the participants’ knowledge, from different but
partly overlapping outcome distributions. Context dependence
was found for the nucleus accumbens and amygdala, in which the
neural response to winning or losing nothing (i.e., $0) depended
on the distribution from which the outcome was drawn. However,
whereas Breiter et al. restricted their analysis of context depend-
ence to a limited set of brain areas, our findings indicate that
reward-sensitive regions throughout the brain demonstrate a high
degree of context dependence. Another difference with the
current study is that in Breiter et al.’s study, the presented
outcomes were not in any way contingent upon the participants’
choices, or perceived by participants as such; instead, the
participants were simply attending to the various stimulus
displays. Importantly, recent research has demonstrated that the
perception of action-outcome contingencies has a large impact on
the (degree of) involvement of various brain areas in reward
processing (Tricomi et al., 2004; Walton et al., 2004; Yeung et
al., in press).
Other evidence consistent with our results has been reported by
recent studies of a reward-sensitive electrophysiological brain
potential thought to be generated in the medial frontal cortex: the
feedback negativity (reviewed in Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004). These
studies have indicated that the evaluative system that produces the
feedback negativity processes gains and losses in a context-
dependent manner (Holroyd et al., 2004a). That is, the amplitude of
the feedback negativity is determined by the value of the eliciting
outcome relative to the range of outcomes possible, rather than by
the objective value of the outcome. In the present study, an
activation focus in the caudal anterior cingulate cortex (6, 34,
29), the presumed generator of the feedback negativity, fell just
below our conservative significance threshold for identifying
reward sensitivity (P = 0.0007). Nevertheless, the pattern of
BOLD responses for this area showed a similar pattern of pure
context dependence as observed for most of the other ROIs
examined. The lack of significant activation in the caudal part of
the anterior cingulate is inconsistent with previous findings ofsignificant activation of the dorsal–caudal ACC to unfavorable
outcomes (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). This finding in combination
with the reliable activation of the posterior cingulate appears more
consistent with recent results suggesting that the feedback
negativity does not originate in the caudal anterior cingulate but
instead reflects the summed activity of a more rostral region of the
anterior cingulate and the posterior cingulate (Mqller et al., 2005;
Van Veen et al., 2004).
An interesting aspect of our results was that some reward-
sensitive ROIs–including the caudate and posterior cingulate
gyrus–did not show a parametric ordering of the three outcomes
in each condition. Instead, these regions showed comparably small
BOLD responses to the intermediate and worst outcomes. To
explain this finding, one might propose that reward processing, at
least of abstract financial reinforcers, is rather coarse in nature,
providing a discrete evaluation of events as good or bad regardless
of magnitude. Similar results have been reported for the feedback
negativity (Holroyd et al., 2004a; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004). In
contrast, the results seem inconsistent with a recent study that
found a parametric ordering (in terms of both timing and
magnitude) of the BOLD responses in left caudate nucleus to the
magnitude of monetary gains and losses (Delgado et al., 2003). As
can be seen in Fig. 2, the left caudate nucleus did not exhibit a
similar parametric ordering in our study. Instead, the BOLD
responses associated with small and intermediate outcomes were
largely overlapping. The precise cause of the discrepancy between
these results remains to be determined. However, a notable
difference between the two studies is that, in the present study,
gains and losses were presented in different contexts, whereas in
the Delgado et al. study, all monetary outcomes were presented in
the same context.
In further analyses, we found that the brain areas that showed
context dependence in the processing of outcomes did not seem
to activate differentially in response to the two choice displays
(that provided the context in which the outcomes were
experienced). This finding might suggest that areas in which
activity is modulated by context do not themselves code the
relevant contextual information, but instead receive this informa-
tion from elsewhere in the brain (cf. Watanabe et al., 2002).
However, a whole-brain analysis using a conservative statistical
threshold did not reveal a single brain area that showed
differential BOLD responses to the choice displays associated
with the win and lose conditions. Previous research, most notably
by Knutson and colleagues, has revealed the involvement of
several distinct brain areas during the anticipation of monetary
gains and losses (for review, see Knutson and Peterson, in press).
A likely reason responsible for this discrepancy concerns the
nature of the task used by Knutson and colleagues: Participants
could obtain a promised reward of varying magnitude by
producing a speeded response to a target stimulus. The
participants used the expectation period to prepare this response
and were presumably more motivated to do so in case of a large
promised reward. Thus, the observed reward-dependent brain
activity may reflect both anticipation of the potential reward and
the degree of motivation to work for that reward (Roesch and
Olson, 2004). In contrast, in the current study, participants did not
have to make active use of the expectation phase, and were not
told the specific reward they could obtain (but instead the range
of possible rewards). Together, these factors may explain the
relatively weak differential activation during the expectation
phase observed in the present study.
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we used did not allow us to measure reliable signals from the
orbitofrontal cortex, a brain area critically involved in reward
processing. This leaves open the question to what extent the
orbitofrontal cortex exhibits context dependence and/or independ-
ence in its response to monetary gains and punishments. Another
possibility is that the orbitofrontal cortex will show a pattern of
activations that is entirely different from those illustrated in Fig.
1B: Several studies have reported that activation of the orbito-
frontal cortex is non-linearly related to objective value, such that
the largest activations are observed for the extreme (highest and
lowest) outcomes (Breiter et al., 2001; Elliott et al., 2003). In any
case, this pattern of results suggests a strong sensitivity of the
orbitofrontal cortex to the range of possible outcomes (see also
Tremblay and Schultz, 1999).
An important issue for future research is to determine whether
the present findings of context dependence in reward processing
generalize to situations in which experienced outcomes are
primary rewards and punishments (rather than abstract monetary
rewards and penalties). This question could be addressed by
modifying the present design so that in the win condition, the
choice display signals a range of appetitive outcomes (e.g., 2
units of juice, 1 unit of juice, or water), and in the lose
condition, the choice display signals a range of aversive
outcomes (e.g., water, 1 unit of saline, or 2 units saline). The
current results predict that brain activity elicited by appetitive
and aversive outcomes should be influenced by the current task
context, independently of whether the outcome eliciting the
activity is a reward or a punishment per se. Such an extension of
the present research would provide further critical insights into
how the reward processing system evaluates the motivational
significance of events as a function of the context in which these
events occur.Acknowledgments
This research was supported by the Netherlands Organization
for Scientific Research (S.N.). We thank Nisan Mol and Sanne
Boesveldt for technical assistance.References
Akitsuki, Y., Sugiura, M., Watanabe, J., Yamashita, K., Sassa, Y., Awata, S.,
Matsuoka, H., Maeda, Y., Matsue, Y., Fukuda, H., Kawashima, R.,
2003. Context-dependent cortical activation in response to financial
reward and penalty: an event-related fMRI study. NeuroImage 19,
1674–1685.
Berns, G.S., McClure, S.M., Pagnoni, G., Montague, P.R., 2001. Predict-
ability modulates human brain response to reward. J. Neurosci. 21,
2793–2798.
Boynton, G.M., Engel, S.A., Glover, G.H., Heeger, D.J., 1996. Linear
systems analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging in human
V1. J. Neurosci. 16, 4207–4221.
Breiter, H.C., Aharon, I., Kahneman, D., Dale, A., Shizgal, P., 2001.
Functional imaging of neural responses to expectancy and experience of
monetary gains and losses. Neuron 30, 619–639.
Burock, M.A., Buckner, R.L., Woldorff, M.G., Rosen, B.R., Dale, A.M.,
1998. Randomized event-related experimental designs allow for
extremely rapid presentation rates using functional MRI. NeuroReport
9, 3735–3739.Delgado, M.R., Locke, H.M., Stenger, V.A., Fiez, J.A., 2003. Dorsal
striatum responses to reward and punishment: effects of valence and
magnitude manipulations. Cogn. Aff. Beh. Neurosci. 3, 27–38.
Delgado, M.R., Stenger, V.A., Fiez, J.A., 2004. Motivation-depend-
ent responses in the human caudate nucleus. Cereb. Cortex 14,
1022–1030.
Elliott, R., Friston, K.J., Dolan, R.J., 2000. Dissociable neural responses in
human reward systems. J. Neurosci. 20, 6159–6165.
Elliott, R., Newman, J.L., Longe, O.A., Deakin, J.F., 2003. Differential
response patterns in the striatum and orbitofrontal cortex to financial
reward in humans: a parametric functional magnetic resonance imaging
study. J. Neurosci. 23, 303–307.
Forman, S.D., Cohen, J.D., Fitzgerald, M., Eddy, W.F., Mintun, M.A., Noll,
D.C., 1995. Improved assessment of significant activation in functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI): use of a cluster-size threshold.
Magn. Reson. Med. 33, 636–647.
Holroyd, C.B., Coles, M.G.H., 2002. The neural basis of human error
processing: reinforcement learning, dopamine, and the error-related
negativity. Psychol. Rev. 109, 679–709.
Holroyd, C.B., Larsen, J.T., Cohen, J.D., 2004a. Context dependence of the
event-related brain potential to reward and punishment. Psychophys 41,
245–253.
Holroyd, C.B., Nieuwenhuis, S., Yeung, N., Nystrom, L.E., Mars, R.B.,
Coles, M.G.H., Cohen, J.D., 2004b. Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex
shows fMRI response to internal and external error signals. Nat.
Neurosci. 7, 497–498.
Josephs, O., Turner, R., Friston, K., 1997. Event-related fMRI. Hum. Brain
Mapp. 5, 243–248.
Knutson, B., Peterson, R., in press. Neurally reconstructing expected utility.
Games Econ. Beh.
McClure, S.M., Berns, G.S., Montague, P.R., 2003. Temporal prediction
errors in a passive learning task activate human striatum. Neuron 38,
339–346.
Montague, P.R., Berns, G.S., 2002. Neural economics and the biological
substrates of valuation. Neuron 36, 265–284.
Mqller, S.V., Mfller, J., Rodriguez-Fornells, A., Mqnte, T.F., 2005. Brain
potentials related to self-generated and external information used for
performance monitoring. Clin. Neurophys. 116, 63–74.
Nakahara, H., Itoh, H., Kawagoe, R., Takikawa, Y., Hikosaka, O., 2004.
Dopamine neurons can represent context-dependent prediction error.
Neuron 41, 269–280.
Nieuwenhuis, S., Holroyd, C.B., Mol, N., Coles, M.G.H., 2004. Reinforce-
ment-related brain potentials from medial frontal cortex: origins and
functional significance. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 28, 441–448.
O’Doherty, J., Kringelbach, M.L., Rolls, E.T., Hornak, J., Andrews, C.,
2001. Abstract reward and punishment representations in the human
orbitofrontal cortex. Nat. Neurosci. 4, 95–102.
O’Doherty, J., Dayan, P., Schultz, J., Deichmann, R., Friston, K., Dolan,
R.J., 2004. Dissociable roles of ventral and dorsal striatum in
instrumental conditioning. Science 304, 452–454.
Ridderinkhof, K.R., Ullsperger, M., Crone, E.A., Nieuwenhuis, S., 2004.
The role of the medial frontal cortex in cognitive control. Science 306,
443–447.
Roesch, M.R., Olson, C.R., 2004. Neuronal activity related to reward value
and motivation in primate frontal cortex. Science 304, 307–310.
Schultz, W., 2002. Getting formal with dopamine and reward. Neuron 36,
241–263.
Talairach, J., Tournoux, P., 1988. Co-planar Stereotaxic Atlas of the Human
Brain: An Approach to Medical Cerebral Imaging. Thieme: Stuttgart,
Germany.
Thut, G., Schultz, W., Roelcke, U., Nienhusmeier, M., Missimer, J.,
Maguire, R.P., Leenders, K.L., 1997. Activation of the human brain by
monetary reward. NeuroReport 8, 1225–1228.
Tremblay, L., Schultz, W., 1999. Relative reward preference in primate
orbitofrontal cortex. Nature 398, 704–708.
Tricomi, E.M., Delgado, M.R., Fiez, J.A., 2004. Modulation of caudate
activity by action contingency. Neuron 41, 281–292.
S. Nieuwenhuis et al. / NeuroImage 25 (2005) 1302–1309 1309Tversky, A., Kahneman, D., 1981. The framing of decisions and the
psychology of choice. Science 211, 453–458.
Van Veen, V., Holroyd, C.B., Cohen, J.D., Stenger, V.A., Carter, C.S.,
2004. Errors without conflict: implications for performance
monitoring theories of anterior cingulate cortex. Brain Cogn. 56,
267–276.
Walton, M.E., Devlin, J.T., Rushworth, M.F., 2004. Interactions between
decision making and performance monitoring within prefrontal cortex.
Nat. Neurosci. 7, 1259–1265.
Watanabe, M., Hikosaka, K., Sakagami, M., Shirakawa, S., 2002. Codingand monitoring of motivational context in the primate prefrontal cortex.
J. Neurosci. 22, 2391–2400.
Yeung, N., Sanfey, A.G., 2004. Independent coding of reward magnitude
and valence in the human brain. J. Neurosci. 24, 6258–6264.
Yeung, N., Holroyd, C.B., Cohen, J.D., in press. ERP correlates of feedback
and reward processing in the presence and absence of response choice.
Cereb. Cortex.
Zalla, T., Koechlin, E., Basso, P., Aquino, P., Sirigu, A., Grafman, J., 1999.
Differential amygdala responses to winning and losing: an fMRI study
in humans. Eur. J. Neurosci. 12, 1764–1770.
